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ARTICLE
INSTALLMENT SALES BY RETAILERS:
A CASE FOR REPEAL OF SECTION 453(a)
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
PATRICIA A. CAIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
With the recent increase in interest rates, the time value of money
has become a more noticeable factor in economic decisionmaking.
Methods of tax deferral have received increasing attention, because
deferring payment of a tax is one way to take advantage of the time value
of money. Tax shelters provide a vehicle for tax deferral. I There are other
obvious vehicles. The accrual basis contractor may elect to report his or
her gain on the completed contract method, 2 thus deferring payment of
taxes until a later year. The cash basis seller of real estate can structure a
sale for promissory notes, the equivalent of cash, and elect to defer gain
under Section 453(b).1 The accrual basis merchant can make credit sales
on an installment plan, thus deferring gain under Section 453(a).
Although tax shelters have recently been the subject of public at-
tack, 4 other deferral methods have been relatively free from critical
scrutiny. It is the purpose of this article to focus on the method available
to merchants who sell on the installment plan, and to scrutinize its
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School. B.A., 1968, Vassar
College; J.D., 1973, University of Georgia Law School.
1. Tax shelters include certain real estate investments that provide the taxpayer with
excess deductions that "shelter" other taxable income. See, e.g., Weinstein, The Partner-
ship as a Tax-Shelter Vehicle Since the Tax Reform Act of 1976,94 BANKING L.J. 440(1977).
Tax shelters typically provide benefits in addition to deferral. The conversion of ordinary
income into capital gain is a prime example. But see Bittker, Tax Shelters and Tax Capitali-
zation or Does the Early Bird Get a Free Lunch? 28 NAT'L TAX J. 416 (1975) (pointing out
that often tax benefits created by shelters have been capitalized in the cost of the sheltered
investment and thus do not always benefit the investor).
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3(d) (1957), as amended by T.D. 7397, 1976-1 C.B. 115. Under
this method, the contractor reports no gain on a given contract until the year in which the
contract is fully completed, even though progress payments are received in earlier years as
the contract is being performed.
3. I.R.C. § 453(b)(1). Gain is reported proportionately as the cash payments on the notes
are received.
4. Many provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525,
were aimed at the elimination of tax shelters. For a summary discussion of certain amend-
ments specifically directed at tax shelters, see Joint Committee Summary: Tax Reform Act
of 1976, 1976-3 C.B. 425, 426-39.
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justification in light of the deferral benefit it offers. The scrutiny of
Section 453(a) will be twofold. First, the provision will be analyzed with
respect to its often articulated statutory purpose: furnishing relief to
merchants who extend installment credit to their customers. Second, the
provision will be analyzed in terms of three goals of tax policy which
today are cited as the three major goals: equity, simplification, and
economic growth.
For the first part of the analysis, it will be necessary to identify the
intended relief. There are two possibilities: (1) relief from an inequitable
burden; and (2) relief from an inconvenient burden. The appropriateness
of each type of relief will be considered in light of the economic and
business setting at the time of original enactment and at the present time.
The analysis will show that neither type of relief is justified, and that by
providing this relief to a single class of taxpayers, that is, retail mer-
chants, Section 453(a) violates one of the major goals of tax policy,
horizontal equity. This article will then consider whether Section 453(a)
can be justified on the basis of either of the other two major goals,
simplification and economic growth. It will contend that fostering
economic growth is the only probable justification for Section 453(a).
That justification will be analyzed in terms of the role the installment plan
has played in encouraging consumption. Then, the effect of increased
consumption on overall economic growth will be analyzed. It is argued
that Section 453(a) is an ineffective means for encouraging consumption
and economic growth. Because the provision cannot be justified on the
other possible grounds, this article concludes by urging that it be re-
pealed.
II. GENERAL HISTORY OF SECTION 453(a)
Before analyzing this provision in terms of the relief it is thought to
provide, a review of the history of the provision is in order. A general
overview would be warranted in any case, as an introduction to the
proposed analysis; but in this case special detail will be presented. The
detail is necessary to provide a basis from which statutory purpose can be
inferred, because, despite general agreement as to statutory purpose, 5
there is no direct evidence of legislative intent.
A. Early History of the Development of the Installment Plan of Selling
and the Consequent Adoption of the Installment
Method of Reporting Gain
Although merchants had developed the "installment plan" as a
5. According to the Internal Revenue Service, the rationale of § 453(a) was to "enable
merchants to actually receive in cash the profit arising out of each installment before the tax
was paid. In other words, the tax could be paid from the proceeds collected rather than be
advanced by the taxpayer." Rev. Rul. 65-185, 1965-2 C.B. 153, 154.
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selling method by 1916,6 the federal tax consequences of selling on such
a plan did not become important until a major increase in tax rates came
into effect in 1918.1 The "installment plan," as the term was used in that
era, meant that the seller was willing to accept a small down payment
(usually twenty-five percent of the sales price or less) and receive the
balance in monthly payments over a period of several years.8 This method
of selling was created by merchants for economic, not tax, reasons. The
plan first developed among mercantile houses dealing in "furniture,
pianos, phonographs, household appliances and farm machinery." 9 Its
purpose was to expand the market for such articles by making them
available to the low-salaried employee who could not otherwise purchase
them. 10
Prior to the use of such plans, merchants sold for cash or on open
account and reported income on the accrual basis. I Under general princi-
ples of accrual basis accounting, articulated by the Supreme Court in
Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner,12 a merchant had to report an
amount as income when his or her "right to receive [the] amount
[became] fixed.' 13 Deductions were accrued when the fact of liability
6. Doyle, Taxation of Income Derived from Installment Sales, 4 TAXES 53, 53 (1926)
[hereinafter cited as Doyle].
7. Id. at 53-54. The following table illustrates the escalation of rates during this period:
Tax Due Tax Due Tax Due
Taxable Income in 1913 in 1916/7 in 1918
$10,000 $100 $ 200 $ 1,070
20,000 200 400 2,150
50,000 800 1,400 11,270
See I W. BARTON & C. BROWNING, BARTON'S FED. TAX LAWS CORRELATED 58-68 (2d ed.
1925).
8. See Blum's Inc., 7 B.T.A. 737,740 (1927); Revenue Revision 1927-28: Hearings before
the House Committee on Ways & Means, 69th-70th Cong., Interim Sess. 225 (1927) (state-
ment of Nathan W. MacChesney).
9. Doyle, supra note 6, at 53.
10. Id.
11. The Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, §§ D, G(c), 38 Stat. 114, and the regulations
promulgated thereunder required the accrual method to be used by all business taxpayers
except farmers. See Schapiro, Prepayments and Distortion of Income Under Cash Basis Tax
Accounting, 30 TAX. L. REV. 117, 129-30 n.35 (1975). The 1916 Act authorized both
individual and corporate taxpayers to use the "actual receipts and disbursements" basis as
well as the accrual basis. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 8(g), 13(d), 39 Stat. 756.
Regulations issued under the 1916 Act, however, required "mercantile corporations" to
include as income for a given year "[a]ll sales made during the year whether compensated
for by accounts receivable, bills receivable, cash or other property." Treas. Reg. 33, art. 92
(1918), 1918 CORPORATION TRUST COMPANY INCOME TAX SERVICE 416.
The 1918 Act basically restated the 1916 Act's accounting provisions. Revenue Act of
1918, ch. 18, § 212(b), 40 Stat. 1057. The regulations promulgated under the 1918 Act
explicitly stated that "in any case in which it is necessary to use an inventory no accounting
in regard to purchases and sales will correctly reflect income except an accrual method."
Treas. Reg. 45, art. 23, T.D. 2873, 1 C.B. 58 (1919).
12. 292 U.S. 182 (1934).
13. Id. at 184.
1978:1
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became certain. ' 4 Deductions, however, were allowable only if there was
specific statutory authorization. Partial uncollectibility, no matter how
certain, was not authorized as a tax deduction for the 1920 merchant.I 5
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in Spring City was indicative
of the pervasive understanding that accrual basis taxpayers must accrue
obligations for future payment at their face value. 16
Application of these accrual basis principles to early installment plan
sellers created problems for them distinct from the problems faced by
other accrual basis sellers. Accrual at face, for example, is an entirely
different issue for sales on open account with payment due in 30 days
than it is for sales involving long term extensions of credit. 17 The fact that
the accrual at face could not be offset by a deduction for projected losses
based on partial uncollectibility 18 created less of a hardship for the short
term credit seller who could normally resolve the issue of final collectibil-
ity soon after the completion of the sale. Resolution of final collectibility
on an installment sale, however, was subject to more lengthy delay
simply because final payment was deferred for so long.
In other words, the accrual method created no meaningful hardship
for the merchant who usually made cash or short term credit sales. The
period between accrual and collection of an open account was short.
When that period became extended to several years, however, as it was
under the installment plan, the hardships became greater. The drain on
cash reserves caused by early payment of taxes could curtail capital
expansion, as well as threaten a floundering business.
Even though merchants quite often received negotiable promissory
notes from their customers representing the installment sale debt, it was
rare that these notes could be discounted at local banks in order to
overcome temporary cash shortages caused by the early incidence of
taxation. 9 One commentator of the period suggested that the risks of
14. See, e.g., W.S. Buck Mercantile Co., 6 B.T.A. 285, 289 (1927) (installment seller's
deduction for a reserve account covering worthless accounts and collection costs disal-
lowed; deduction permitted only in the year that the loss is finally "ascertained"); Morri-
son-Ricker Mfg. Co., 2 B.T.A. 1008, 1011 (1925) (seller's deduction of sales value of goods
that it anticipated would eventually be returned disallowed).
15. In 1920, the authorization for a bad debt deduction required that the debt be wholly
worthless. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 234(a)(5), 40 Stat. 1057. The use of bad debt
reserves was not authorized until 1921. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a), 42 Stat. 227.
16. Accrual at face value is the accepted rule today. However an argument could have
been made in 1918 that accrual at face should not have been the rule for installment sales
accounts, which, unlike the 30-day open accounts involved in Spring City, were outstanding
for a number of years. See Cain, Taxation of Promises to Pay, 8 GA. L. REV. 125, 146 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Cain]. The question of whether or not the accrual method should
require accrual of installment sales accounts at face value has become less important since
the authorization of bad debt reserves in 1921 because such a reserve may be used to
account for projected losses. See note 15 supra.
17. See Cain, supra note 16.
18. A seller could neither utilize a bad debt reserve nor take a specific deduction for the
projected loss. See note 15 supra.
19. See Doyle, supra note 6, at 53.
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default on installment sales payments were so high "that it is quite
impossible to say that the dealer realizes an immediate profit upon the
execution of a contract of sale and the payment of the initial install-
ment. . . 20
It was within this framework of significant deferral of the receipt of
cash and high risk of default, accentuated by steeply increased tax rates,
that the Treasury Department in 1918 first officially recognized the
installment method of reporting income for tax purposes. 21 The 1918
regulations allowed installment sellers to report as income "that propor-
tion of each installment payment, which the gross profit to be realized
when the contract is fully performed, bears to the gross contract price." 22
This regulation created the installment method as is presently prescribed
by Section 453 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
In 1925, however, the Board of Tax Appeals held this Treasury
regulation invalid in B.B. Todd, Inc. 23 The Board regarded the install-
ment method as a hybrid cash-accrual method. Deductions relating to the
installment sales were allowed immediately as accrued, whereas income
from the sales was deferred until cash payments were received.24 Such a
hybrid method did not clearly reflect income as required by statute. 25
Lacking statutory authorization, the installment method was therefore
invalid.
The Senate Finance Committee responded by inserting Section
212(d) into the Revenue Act of 1926.26 There is markedly little legislative
history on this provision. The need for the provision was never discussed
in the House. Apparently, the Senate had considered the advisability of
relief for installment sellers as early as 1917, but was willing to rely on
the then soon-to-be-promulgated Treasury regulations. 27 The insertion of
Section 212(d) in the Revenue Act of 1926 appears to be a belated
20. Id.
21. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 120 (1918), 1918 CORPORATION TRUST COMPANY INCOME TAX
SERVICE 422. Under this regulation, the installment method was available for reporting
income from those installment sales in which title remained in the vendor until full payment
was made. Id.
22. Id.
23. 1 B.T.A. 762 (1925).
24. For example, selling expenses would be deductible currently even though they might
be directly connected with an installment sale on which income could be deferred. In
addition, deductions such as those for interest, taxes, and depreciation are normally deduct-
ible currently. See Cox & Harris, Installment Sales for "Dealers" in Personal Property:
Review and Analysis (pt. iv), 5 TAX ADVISER 132, 139 (1974).
25. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 200, 40 Stat. 1057.
26. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 212(d), 44 Stat. 9. Section 212(d) provided in part:
Under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the
Secretary, a person who regularly sells or otherwise disposes of personal property on
the installment plan may return as income therefrom in any taxable year that propor-
tion of the installment payments actually received in that year which the total profit
realized or to be realized when the payment is completed, bears to the total contract
price . . ..
27. See Doyle, supra note 6, at 54.
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endorsement of the procedure for reporting installment income that had
been devised by the Treasury, an endorsement necessitated by the B.B.
Todd decision. 28
In the absence of specific legislative history, one can infer legislative
intent only from the known facts. It seems fair to conclude that the
installment method of reporting gain was intended to give some type of
relief to merchants who sold property on the installment plan, as that term
was understood in the early 20th century. The main characteristics of an
installment plan sale that differentiated it from other credit sales were a
lengthier term of payment and high collection risks. 29 These two charac-
teristics meant that merchants could not convert their sales into cash until
well after the tax would normally be due. 30 Deferral of the tax payment
was probably viewed as appropriate relief for the hardship created by this
method of credit selling.
B. Subsequent History
In 1926, Congress determined that the installment method should be
available as an alternative to certain merchants who would otherwise be
forced to report gains on a strict accrual basis. Availability of the method,
then as now, was tied to a single prerequisite: the merchant must be one
who regularly sells on the installment plan. 31 Congress did not, however,
define "installment plan." Because the availability of the installment
method is largely dependent upon the meaning of this term,32 the evolu-
tion of its meaning will be reviewed.
The term "installment plan" had a specialized meaning in 1918
which was derived from the business practices of the era. The regulations
as passed pursuant to the 1918 Act, for example, cited four types of sales
utilized by dealers in personal property: (1) cash sales, (2) personal credit
sales, (3) installment plan sales, and (4) deferred payment sales.33 The
only specific distinction made for tax purposes was between installment
plan sales and deferred payment sales, the latter being characterized as
including a substantial down payment. 34 These regulations also pointed
28. According to the Board of Tax Appeals, the B.B. Todd decision was brought to the
Senate's attention and was the primary reason for the introduction and subsequent enact-
ment of § 212(d). See Blum's Inc., 7 B.T.A. 737, 755 (1927).
29. Doyle, supra note 6, at 53.
30. Id.
31. More specifically, § 453(a) is available to regular sellers of personal property on the
installment plan. Section 453(b) governs all sales of real property as well as certain sales of
personalty.
32. Availability of the installment method also depends upon the construction of "regu-
larly sells." Courts have generally construed the phrase broadly. Cox & Harris, Installment
Sales for "Dealers " in Personal Property: Review and Analysis (pt. 1), 4 TAX ADVISER 658,
662-63 (1973). See Louis Greenspon, 23 T.C. 138 (1954) modified on other grounds, 229 F.2d
947 (8th Cir. 1956); Davenport Machine & Foundry Co., 18 T.C. 39 (1952).
33. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 42 (1919), as amended by T.D. 3082, 3 C.B. 107 (1920).
34. "Occasionally a ... type of sale is met with, in which the buyer makes an initial
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out that installment plan sales normally involved one of four different
methods for protection against default.35 Thus, in 1918, sales on the
"installment plan" were characterized by a small down payment and the
creation of some type of security interest in the property sold. Both of
these characteristics reflect the fundamental nature of the transaction: a
sale involving significant deferral of cash36 and high risk of default.
Although the seller's retention of a security interest 38 was a common
feature of installment plan sales, presumably a merchant could choose to
forego that protection and still be selling on the installment plan. This is
so because the existence of a security interest was merely indicative of the
risk element. Nonetheless, in the first major dispute over the meaning of
"installment plan," the Commissioner took the position that the security
interest was the pivotal characteristic. 39 The basis of his argument was
that all early installment plans provided for a security interest. 40
The court responded by stating:
[Taxpayer's plan] may have dropped some of the features
which had commonly been found in earlier installment plans,
such as a retention of a security interest or the attribution of
each payment to the purchase price of one specific item sold,
because such features were impractical in a plan designed to
cover not a single large sale but a series of transactions involv-
ing numerous smaller items. But it has retained the essential
feature of an arrangement for the payment by the purchaser for
the merchandise sold to him in a series of periodic payments of
an agreed part or installment of the debt due. 41
The court did not explain why it considered "a series of periodic
payments" the essential feature, nor did it explain why identifying the
payment of such a substantial nature (for example, a payment of more than 25 percent) that
the sale, though involving deferred payments, is not one on the installment plan." Id.
35. The four methods are as follows: (I) Seller retains title. (2) Purchaser receives title,
and Seller retains lien. (3) Purchaser receives title and gives Seller a mortgage. (4) Seller
conveys title to a trustee who will convey to Purchaser upon final payment. Id.
36. A small down payment was all that was required because purchasers did not have
much discretionary wage income with which to purchase the semi-luxuries normally sold on
the installment plan. For the same reason, these purchasers were able to make only small
monthly payments and thus the payment period was typically stretched out over a number
of years. See Doyle, supra note 6, at 53.
37. Significant deferral of cash, of course, is causally related to collection risks-as is the
size of the down payment. An early analyst advocated adherence to three "safety princi-
ples" for avoiding default: (i) the down payment should be sufficient to give the purchaser a
sense of ownership; (2) at no time should the unpaid balance be more than the resale value of
the goods; and (3) payment should be completed before sufficient time has elapsed to permit
the buyer to feel that his purchase is obsolete. Ayres, Installment Buying and Its Financing,
in AMERICAN AssoC. OF PERSONAL FINANCE COS., YEAR BOOK OF PERSONAL FINANCE 95-103
(1931), cited in R. GARIS, PRINCIPLES OF MONEY AND CREDIT 354-55 (1933).
38. The present discussion applies as well to the creation of a security interest via the
buyer's conveyance of a mortgage. See note 35 supra.
39. Consolidated Dry Goods Co. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1960).
40. Id. at 880.
41. Id. at 882.
1978:1
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essential feature of "installment plan" sales was necessary. The court
also did not state whether the term "installment plan" had some
specialized meaning drawn, for example, from the statutory purpose.
Instead, it reasoned:
It is true that the particular plan now used by [taxpayer]
was probably unknown in 1926 when this statutory provision
was first enacted. But it cannot be held that the meaning of
these words as used in the 1926 Act and as repeated in succes-
sive statutes must be frozen to such an extent that they now
refer only to the exact forms of installment plan known in 1926.
The words must be interpreted to include such changes and
developments in installment selling as fairly fall within the
generic meaning of sales "on the installment plan." 42
The generic meaning of "sales on the installment plan" was defined
in this case to be "sales involving two or more payments." ' 43 This
dictionary type approach, still followed by the courts today,' overlooks
the relief aspects of the hypothesized statutory purpose.
Congress also appears to follow this dictionary approach. Although
it has never dealt with the meaning of the term "installment plan"
directly,45 it has taken specific action which serves as indirect support for
the "two or more payments" test. In 1964, Congress enacted a provision
which mandated the availability of installment method reporting for
merchants who sold on a revolving credit type plan.46 Revolving credit
plans were to qualify if they met the two payment testy.4  Because of
technical difficulties in determining which revolving credit plan sales
qualified under the statute, Congress repealed the statute 6 months after
its enactment. 48 The repeal was accompanied by reinstatement of regula-
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 881. In addition to Consolidated Dry Goods, see W.T. Grant Co. v. Comm'r,
483 F.2d 1115 (2d Cir. 1973), in which a coupon book installment sales plan, which grouped
together a number of purchases, was found not to qualify for installment reporting, even
though two or more payments might occur, because there was no way to correlate the
payments to individual sales of property. Although two payments might occur, each pay-
ment might fully cover the purchase of a single item. Thus, it was impossible to identify
which individual sales constituted installment sales-i.e., those paid for by two or more
payments.
44. See note 43 supra. See also Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc. v. United States, 481 F.2d
1283 (Ct. Cl. 1973), and 10-42 Corp., 55 T.C. 593 (1971), both of which apply the two
payments test to installment sellers electing under § 453(b).
45. Le., the term has never been defined by statute.
46. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 222(a), 78 Stat. 75, which provided:
For purposes of subsection (a) [of section 453], the term "installment plan"
includes a revolving credit type plan which provides that the purchaser of personal
property at retail may pay for such property in a series of periodic payments of an
agreed portion of the amounts due the seller under the plan, except that such term
does not include any such plan with respect to a purchaser who uses his account
primarily as an ordinary charge account.
47. Id. Prior to congressional action, Treasury regulations authorized installment treat-
ment for certain revolving credit plan sales. See note 49 infra.
48. Act of Aug. 31, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-539, § 3, 78 Stat. 746. Congressional debate on
the repeal provision centered on which revolving credit plan charges should be treated as
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tions specifying the types of revolving credit plan sales that would
qualify.49 Qualification was linked to a modified "two or more pay-
ments" test.50
Congress, then, appears to agree with the judicially created test.5 '
The existence of periodic payments is the sole prerequisite for establish-
ing an "installment plan" sale. The current Treasury regulations reflect
this consensus by defining "sale on the installment plan" as:
(1) A sale of personal property by the taxpayer under any
plan for the sale or other disposition of personal property which
plan, by its terms and conditions, contemplates that each sale
under the plan will be paid for in two or more payments, or
(2) A sale of personal property by the taxpayer under any
plan for the sale or other disposition of personal property-
(i) Which plan, by its terms and conditions, contemplates
that such sale will be paid for in two or more payments, and
(ii) Which sale is in fact paid for in two or more pay-
ments .52
Whatever this circuitous definition may or may not accomplish, its
emphasis on two or more payments is unmistakable.
C. Conclusions as to Purpose Based on History
Although the early history of installment selling supports the view
that the installment method was intended as a relief provision, it becomes
installment payments, not on whether the installment method should be generally available
to merchants using revolving credit plans. 110 CONG. REc. 20033, 20033-34 (1964) (remarks
of Senator Hartke).
49. Prior to passage of the Revenue Act of 1964, Treasury regulations had set forth a
procedure for determining what proportion of revolving credit plan charges were to be
treated as installment plan payments. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2(d), T.D. 6682, 1963-2 C.B. 197.
These regulations were implicitly repealed by the Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272,
§ 222(a), 78 Stat. 75, but were restored by the Act of Aug. 31, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-539, § 3,
78 Stat. 746. See 110 CONG. REC. 20033, 20034 (1964) (remarks of Senator Hartke).
50. See Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2(d)(1)(1958), as amended by T.D. 6682, 1963-2 C.B. 197, and
T.D. 6804, 1965-1 C.B. 215 (authorizing installment plan treatment for "sales under a
revolving credit plan (1) which are of the type which the terms and conditions of the plan
contemplate will be paid for in two or more installments and (2) which are charged to
accounts on which subsequent payments indicate that such sales are being paid for in two or
more installments") (emphasis added). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2(b)(2)(1958), as amended by
T.D. 6682, 1963-2 C.B. 197 (quoted in text accompanying note 52 infra).
Since a revolving credit plan may involve some periodic payment sales and some
regular credit sales, sampling procedures must be followed by the merchant in order to
establish what percentage of revolving credit sales will be deemed to result in two or more
payments. This percentage may then be reported on the installment method. Treas. Reg. §
1.453-2(b)(2), (d) (1958), as amended by T.D. 6682, 1963-2 C.B. 197, and T.D. 6804, 1965-1
C.B. 215.
51. That is, the test stated in Consolidated Dry Goods Co. v. United States, 180 F. Supp.
878 (D. Mass. 1960). See text accompanying notes 39-43 supra.
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2(b)(1958), as amended by T.D. 6682, 1963-2 C.B. 197. Subparag-
raph (I) of this regulation is meant to refer to "traditonal installment plan" sales, whereas
subparagraph (2) refers to sales under "revolving credit plans." Id. Apparently sales of the
former type qualify whether or not the two payment'test is in fact met.
1978:1
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more difficult to understand the justification for that relief in light of the
more recent development of the "two or more payments" test. Relief is
deemed appropriate, according to the statute, when someone sells on the
installment plan. There were certain characteristics of the early install-
mentplan which suggested relief was appropriate, such as lengthy defer-
ral of the receipt of cash and risk of collection. Today, however, relief
becomes available provided regular sales are made in which two or more
payments are made by the purchaser. The two payments may occur
within 2 days or within 2 years. 53 Furthermore, relief is available even in
cases in which payment may be practically ensured.54 Therefore, it
appears that the term "installment sale" has not been construed consis-
tent with the apparent purpose of the statute.
Nonetheless, commentators5 5 and even the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice 56 continue to characterize Section 453(a) as a relief provision. No one,
however, has attempted to explain exactly what type of relief it is thought
to provide, or asked whether relief, from whatever the burden may be, is
in fact appropriate. 57 The next section of this article will address these
issues.
III. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 453(a) AS A RELIEF PROVISION
"The installment provisions were intended primarily to relieve per-
sons engaged in selling furniture or other chattels on the installment plan
from paying an income tax on the entire transaction at the outset when,
because of the failure of the purchasers to meet all their payments,
nothing like the expected profit might ever be realized.'"58
This statement is representative of attempts by commentators and
courts to identify the legislative purpose behind the enactment of the
installment method provisions. 59 The problem with this statement is that
although its author identifies "relief" as the primary purpose, it does not
53. If the 2 days occur in different tax years, then partial deferral of gain is possible.
54. For example, many retailers today utilize elaborate credit check procedures and sell
on credit only to those customers who have a strong credit standing.
55. "A retail taxpayer reporting income on the accrual basis finds that he is paying
income tax on the profit from credit sales before the customer remits the cash .... "
Wiese, Techniques of Installment Sales and Revolving Credit: Methods of Election; Bulk
Sales of Receivables and Notes, 23 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 905, 905 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Wiese]. See also Mero, The Installment Basis for Dealers in Personal Property, 25
TAXES 223 (1947).
56. According to the Internal Revenue Service, the rationale of § 453(a) was to "enable
merchants to actually receive in cash the profit arising out of each installment before the tax
was paid." Rev. Rul. 65-185, 1965-2 C.B. 153, 154.
57. Some commentators, however, have noted generally that the installment method and
its justification should be reviewed. See Surrey & Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget-
Response to Professor Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 528, 533 (1969).
58. Mero, The Installment Basis for Dealers in Personal Property, 25 TAXES 223, 223
(1947).
59. See W.T. Grant v. Comm'r, 483 F.2d 1115 (2d Cir. 1973); Pendergast v. Comm'r, 22
B.T.A. 1259, 1262 (1931).
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directly indicate from what the relief must be provided. It is true that the
installment method furnishes relief from immediate payment of taxes, but
this relief is only the means chosen by Congress. Choice of this particular
means says nothing about the end purpose that Congress had in mind.
Apparently Congress believed that installment plan sellers were suffering
from some hardship which necessitated relief from immediate payment of
taxes. The question is what that hardship is.
The perceived hardship must have resulted from the application of
accrual basis accounting principles to installment plan sellers. There are
two distinct possible hardships: (1) accounting for gain at the time of sale
created an unfair burden on installment plan sellers in relation to the tax
burden of other sellers, and (2) requiring payment of the tax in the
absence of cash receipts created an inconvenience to the installment
seller.
In order to discuss these two possibilities it will be necessary to refer
to classical notions of tax policy. There is evidence from early legislative
debates on the income tax that in choosing income as the appropriate tax
base, Congress implicitly approved of two classical principles of taxa-
tion: fairness and convenience of payment.6'
A. Creation of an Unfair Burden
Adam Smith's first principle of taxation states:
The subjects of every state ought to contribute to the support of
the government, as nearly as possible in proportion to their
respective abilities: That is, in proportion to the revenue which
they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. In the
observation or neglect of this maxim consists what is called the
equality or inequality of taxation. 61
A tax should be fair, and this means that each individual should bear his
or her fair share of the burden of the tax. 62 The quote from Smith suggests
that "ability to pay" is a fair measure of what one's burden ought to be.63
Thus, if the installment plan seller is less "able to pay" than other sellers,
he or she should be accorded relief to prevent an unfair distribution of the
burden. 6
4
60. See, e.g., 44 CONG. REC. 532-36 (1909) (remarks of Rep. Hull).
61. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS,
bk. 5, ch. 2, at 361 (Great Books ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as A. SMITH].
62. J.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 484 (1904) [hereinafter cited as J.S.
MILL].
63. In the most recent policy statement by the Treasury Department, questions regarding
the definition of a fair measure are addressed in terms of the "ability-to-pay" approach and
also in terms of a "standard-of-living" approach. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUE-
PRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 41 (1977). The Treasury report notes that our present system
of taxation encompasses the "ability-to-pay" approach.
64. "Ability to pay," in this context, refers to a theoretical measure of ability, such as
that reflected in R.M. Haig's definition of income as an increase in economic power, and not
to a practical measure of ability which might be reflected in a taxpayer's temporary lack of
cash. See Haig, The Concept of Income, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (R. Haig, ed. 1921).
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This raises the question of what, in keeping with our notion of
fairness, the most appropriate measure of "ability to pay" is. In enacting
the income tax in 1913, Congress answered this question by providing
income as the most appropriate measure. That answer, however, leads
only to the question of what income is.
In the often quoted words of a well-known economist, R.M. Haig,
"[i]ncome is the money value of the net accretion to one's economic
power between two points in time. " 65 Another well-known economist,
Henry Simons, has interpreted "net accretion" to mean the sum of an
individual's consumption and accumulation. In more detail: "Personal
income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of
rights exercised in consumption, and (2) the change in the value of the
store of property rights between the beginning and the end of the period in
question. "6
Today, those familiar with developments in tax policy refer to the
above concepts as the Haig-Simons definition of income. 67 Proponents of
a broader tax base use the Haig-Simons concept as a touchstone for their
discussions. 68 Thus, in analyzing fairness in the sense of "ability to pay"
it seems appropriate to make reference to the Haig-Simons concept.
The problem, then, is to determine the best way to measure the
ability to pay of an installment plan seller relative tothe ability to pay of
other sellers. Specifically, we must measure their relative abilities to pay
at a specific point in time, such as the time of sale. 69 A simple comparison
could be made by asking what each seller gave up and what each received
in return. A comparison of relative changes in fair market values-that is,
fair market value of property received minus fair market value of property
transferred-should serve as a comparison of relative abilities to pay,
because it would identify the "net accretion" of each of the two types of
sellers.70
Assume that the most important distinction between installment plan
retailers and other retailers 7' was perceived, at least in 1918, as being the
significant deferral of receipt of cash by the installment plan retailer. The
question then becomes whether significant deferral of the receipt of cash
makes one retailer less "able to pay" taxes than another retailer who has
cash in hand. The following comparison should suggest an answer.
65. Id.
66. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
67. See, e.g., Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform,
80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967).
68. Id.
69. We could choose another point in time, such as the time for payment of tax. For
purposes of comparison, however, the particular point in time is irrelevant; we need only
use the same point in time for each seller.
70. This comparison is merely an application of the Haig-Simons concept to installment
sellers.
71. I.e., those who sell for cash or on open account.
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A and B each sell a widget on December 31, 1976. The widget costs
each seller $1,000. A sells for $2,000 cash. B sells for $2,000 cash to be
paid on December 31, 1977. The conclusion is that, in 1976, A is more
"able to pay" than B because the fair market value of $2,000 cash is
significantly greater than the fair market value of $2,000 cash one year
hence. 72 Therefore, A and B should be taxed differently.
Requiring each to accrue a gain of $1,000 in 1976, the year of sale,
would place an unfair burden on B. This is so because B does not in
reality have a $1,000 gain, but something less. What the "something
less" is depends on a number of factors, the most significant of which is
the current time value of money. 73
If B is a good business person, she knows that $2,000 one year
hence is worth something less than $2,000 cash. If she knows that her
widget can be sold for $2,000 cash, as A's widget was, it makes no sense
for her to sell it for something less. B is likely, therefore, to charge her
purchaser an additional charge which reflects the current time value of
money.74 Whether this charge is in the form of stated interest or in the
form of an inflated deferred sales price makes little difference. 75 In the
end, she will receive something in excess of $2,000 cash to compensate
her for foregoing the immediate receipt of cash. If the current time value
of money were 20%, for example, B should charge her purchaser a total
of $2,400 to be paid on December 31, 1977. If she did so her "ability to
pay" measured in terms of fair market value on December 31, 1976
would be no different from A's "ability to pay." B's right to receive
$2,400 one year hence is exactly equal in value to A's $2,000 in cash.7 6
Because it is fairly clear that early installment plan sellers were
72. Provided, of course, that the rate of interest for the one year time period is positive.
See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS 205-09 (2d ed. 1967). For example, if
the going interest rate were 10% the current value of $2,200 due in one year would be $2,000
because $2,000 invested at 10% for one year would yield $2,200.
73. For a complete list of factors affecting the fair market value of a promise to pay cash
in the future, see Cain, Taxation of Promises to Pay, 8 GA. L. REV. 125, 135-45 (1973).
Typically, time value is reflected in and roughly equivalent to the interest rate that banks
charge their borrowers.
74. This hypothetical assumes that other factors affecting the fair market value of a
promise to pay cash in the future, such as the risk of default, have no effect. See Cain,
supra note 73, for a list of these other factors.
75. The form of the charge may, however, make some differences for tax purposes,
primarily on the buyer's side of the transaction. Prior to the enactment of § 163(b), which
imputes interest at the rate of 6% on installment purchases if the interest is not separately
stated, the installment plan purchaser would have had difficulty deducting an interest charge
unless it was separately stated as such. See Marsh & Marsh, Inc., 5 B.T.A. 902 (1926); Carl
Lang, 3 B.T.A. 417 (1926) (deferred purchase prices contain no interest element). Even
now, § 163(b) limits the deduction to an imputed factor of only 6%. I.R.C. § 163(b).
On the seller's side of the transaction, interest, if not separately stated, will be imputed
under § 483, but only in cases involving sales of capital gains property. I.R.C. § 483; Treas.
Reg. § 1.483-2(b)(3)(1966).
76. If the time value of money is 20%, then the $2,400 must be discounted by 16 2/3% to
calculate its present value, which yields $2,000. Alternatively, if $2,000 were invested for.
one year at 20%, at the end of the year the amount would increase to $2,400.
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charging interest rates that at least accounted for the time value of
money, 77 no unfair burden was created by taxing them at time of sale,
absent any other considerations. The time value of money, however, was
but one factor affecting the present value of the right to future cash.
The most important of the other factors was the high risk of de-
fault. 78 Because bad debt reserves were not available to the accrual basis
seller in 1918, collection losses could be deducted for tax purposes only
when the debt became uncollectible. 79 For sellers other than installment
plan sellers uncollectibility was likely to be established, and therefore a
deduction allowed, within a reasonable time after the sale. 80 The install-
ment seller, on the other hand, might not be able to justify a deduction for
uncollectibility until years after the sale. 81 In the early years of install-
ment plan selling, accrual basis reporting might have required payment of
taxes on some gains that were never in fact realized. Moreover, the
availability of a deduction in a subsequent year was not sufficient to offset
the true cost of paying taxes on the gain in the year of sale, because the
deduction merely served to reduce taxable income in the year it was
claimed. It did not allow the seller fully to recover excess taxes paid in a
prior year or account for interest on the excess taxes. 82 Thus, one might
77. Yields from U.S. Government securities in the 1920's ranged from 2% to 6% and
averaged around 4%. R. KESSEL, THE CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE TERM STRUCTURE OF
INTEREST RATES 68-70 (1965). There are similar indications from the early cases that the
actual time value of money during this period was in the neighborhood of 4-6%. See Daniel
Bros., 7 B.T.A. 1086, 1087-88 (1927), aff'd, 28 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1928) (real estate contract
allowed for prepayment discount at rate of 6%); Marsh & Marsh, Inc. 5 B.T.A. 902, 903
(1926) (real estate prepayment discount at rate of 4%).
At least one installment sales case, however, from this period suggests that the amount
of the sales price ostensibly allocated to interest by installment sellers was much higher. In
Anderson & Co., 6 B.T.A. 713 (1927), a taxpayer who had sold goods at cost plus 120%
indicated that -40 per cent was added for overhead, 40 per cent as interest, 20 per cent to
cover charges for collection and the remaining 20 per cent as profit." Id. at 716. The 40%
interest figure yields an annual interest rate in excess of 10%.
Further, a report issued by the Federal Trade Commission in 1923 indicates that stores
that sold household products on the installment plan showed mark-ups more than sufficient
to cover the cost of deferred payment. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HOUSE FURNISHINGS
INDUSTRIES: SUMMARY OF REPORT OF THE F.T.C. ON HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE 21 (1923)
[hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT].
78. Doyle, supra note 6, at 53.
79. To be deductible, debts had to be fully uncollectible. See text accompanying notes
12-16 supra.
80. Sales of household goods made on a non-installment basis generally required pay-
ment within 90 days. FTC REPORT, supra note 77, at 25.
81. Since final payment might not be due until 3 years after the time of sale, it might be 3
years before a merchant could establish an individual account as uncollectible. For example,
the purchaser might make payments for the first 2 1/2 years and then default. At that point
the merchant would be entitled to a deduction; but in the meantime, having accrued a
taxable gain at the time of sale, the merchant would have already paid taxes on the gain
represented by the uncollected payments.
82. For example, even if the deduction in year four saved the merchant an amount in
taxes in that year exactly equal to the amount paid as taxes in year one on the gain that was
never fully collected, the merchant would nonetheless have lost the use of that amount of
money during the 4-year period. If the merchant was in a higher tax bracket in the year of
sale than in the year of deduction, he or she also would have lost the extra value of a
deduction taken in a higher bracket.
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argue that the installment method provided for some relief from this
added cost.
The question then becomes whether the cost imposed by the long
delay between the reporting of income and deducting of uncollectible
debts creates an unfair burden which the tax laws should attempt to
alleviate. Since the seller could pass this cost through to the purchaser in
the form of a higher deferred selling price, it arguably is inappropriate for
the Government to consider granting the seller relief through preferential
tax treatment. If the higher selling price reflects a tax burden that is
unfair, however, passing the burden on to the purchaser does not make it
any fairer. For example, absent collectibility problems, taxing our install-
ment seller on a $1,000 profit on December 31, 1976, is taxing the true
measure of her ability to pay. 83 The payment by B's purchaser of an extra
$400 reflects a "true cost" 84 -the time value of money. Taxing our
installment seller on a $1,000 profit when problems as to collectibility not
accounted for in the selling price or interest charge suggest that a some-
what smaller profit is her actual income, however, is unfair because it
taxes more than her ability to pay. She may, of course, pass this cost
through to her purchasers in the form of higher sales prices, but the mere
fact that she is capable of shifting the incidence of the tax burden in this
manner does not justify an otherwise inappropriate tax measure. In other
words, the cost of the time value of money represents a "true cost" of
something of value to the purchaser. The "tax cost" of subsequent
uncollectibility, however, results from a tax system that fails to account
for the risks of uncollectibility at the time of sale. This cost differs from
the "true cost" of uncollectibility, which results from the seller's failure
to recoup the cost of goods sold to a defaulting purchaser. Although it
might be fair to pass the "true cost" on to purchasers, it is not fair to
make purchasers bear the "tax cost."s8 Under this analysis, installment
83. The present value of $2,400 due in one year at 20% interest less $1,000 basis equals
$1,000 gain.
84. A "true cost," as the term is used in this article, is a cost which is occasioned by the
free operation of the market and not a cost which results from governmental intrusion in the
market's operation. Costs which result from governmental intrusion are identified herein as
"tax costs." Thus, "true costs" are the result of equal bargaining in a free market, whereas
"tax costs" are directly linked to governmental action (the action being not just that of the
government as another participant in the market, but action arising from an essential
governmental function, such as the taxing function). Passing this $400 interest charge on to
the purchaser is fair since it represents a true cost of providing credit to consumers. The
availability of credit is presumably of value to those consumers who wish to purchase on
credit, and it is fair for them to pay its costs. Of course, it might be argued that the cost is
one that should be borne by all consumers (in the form of higher prices in general) since the
availability of consumer credit benefits all consumers by increasing the supply of consumer
goods and presumably lowering prices. This, however, relates to a pricing decision made by
the merchant, and not to the distinction between "true" and "tax" costs.
85. One could claim that the "tax cost" of uncollectibility is in a sense part of the time
value of money. But if economic neutrality is accepted as a goal of tax policy, then taxes
should not affect the market's determination of the time value of money (except, of course,
when taxes are intended to interrupt the free operation of the market in order to further
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plan sellers in 1918 were suffering from a hardship caused by the
interaction of two factors: the significant uncollectibility of accounts and
the inability to take account of that fact for tax purposes at the time of
sale. Although this was a hardship that could conceivably have plagued
any credit seller in those times, the degree of hardship would have been
noticeably less for the short term credit seller. First, collection problems
for such sellers were less severe, 86 and second, whatever uncollectibility
did exist could be accounted for relatively sooner for tax purposes.8 7
In view of the greater hardship facing installment plan sellers, the
installment method may have been intended to relieve them from this
hardship and thus from bearing an unfair share of the burden. This
particular problem, however, could have been solved more directly- and
in fact it was in 1921, when Congress authorized the use of bad debt
reserves for tax accounting purposes. 88 A bad debt reserve allows a seller,
in effect, to take a current deduction at the time of the credit sale for
anticipated losses due to collection problems.89 With the advent of the
bad debt reserve, the installment plan seller's economic position relative
to other sellers should have been equalized.
To demonstrate this fact, reconsider the prior example of A, the cash
seller, and B, the installment plan seller. Assume that A sells his $1,000
widget for $2,000 cash and B sells her identical widget for $2,400 cash to
be paid in one year. The time value of money is 20%. Assume further that
both A and B pay taxes at the rate of 50%.' At the end of one year A's
total cash will be $1,650, consisting of a $500 after-tax profit on the
some other goal of tax policy). See Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17
STAN. L. REV. 567, 568-90 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Sneed], for an explanation of the
neutrality principle, which Sneed designates "Free Market Compatibility." Basically, the
principle of neutrality means that taxes should not affect resource allocation as it is
determined by the market.
86. See Doyle, supra note 6, at 53.
87. See note 80 supra.
88. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a), 42 Stat. 227.
89. With IRS approval, a taxpayer may set up a bad debt reserve in lieu of deduct-
ing specific debts that become worthless during the tax year. The taxpayer may take a
deduction for any "reasonable addition" made to the reserve. I.R.C. § 166(c). The regula-
tion generally applicable to bad debt deductions, Treas. Reg. § 1. 166-1 (1959) as amended by
T.D. 6996, 1969-1 C.B. 88, applies to taxpayers using the reserve method. For rules specially
applicable to bad debt reserves, see Treas. Reg. § 1. 166-4 (1959), as amended by T.D. 6728,
1964-1 C.B. 195, and T.D. 7444, 1977-2 I.R.B. 6.
90. If A and B are in different tax brackets, their incomes, after taxes, will obviously be
different. Tax brackets differ based on the total amount of income one has, brackets being
more progressive for individuals than for corporations. Thus if A's total income is greater
than B's, he will pay taxes at a rate greater than B. This progressive aspect of our taxing
system reflects the principle of vertical equity. See generally W. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS
OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1976) at Chapter I [hereinafter cited as W. KLEIN].
For purposes of demonstration, A and B have been placed in the same tax bracket. If
they were in different brackets, their incomes and taxes would be different, but the
difference would arise from the progressiveness of the tax structure, not the installment
seller's inability to account for the risks of uncollectibility at the time of sale. Therefore it
would have no bearing on the point which this example is meant to demonstrate-that A and
B are equally able to pay even though A sells for cash and B sells on credit.
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sale, 9 1 plus $1,000 return of basis, plus a $150 return on cash invested for
the year.92 Under the accrual method as it is now applied, B would report
a gain of $1,000 at the time of sale and pay a tax of $500. Since she has
received no cash, she would have to borrow the $500 at 20%. At the end
of the year she would report the $400 interest charge on the sale as
interest income from her extension of credit to the purchaser. 93 Thus, her
cash position at the end of the one year period will be $2,400 received
less $600 repayment of the loan94 less $200 taxes paid on the $400
interest element. This yields a total of $1,600, which is less than the
$1,650 cash in A's hands. There is, however, one final factor to be
considered. B has paid $100 in interest, which, because it can be deduct-
ed from other income95 and thereby reduce B's taxes, is worth $50. 96 If
this $50 is added to her $1,600 in cash, the total is $1,650-the same
amount of cash that A has at that point in time.
This example assumes that B collects in full. If B knows from
experience that she will not collect in full, then she will charge something
more than $2,400. Assume she typically experiences a rate of uncollecti-
bility equal to 10% of her credit sales price. She will charge $2,640 to her
purchaser and through use of the bad debt reserve she will take an
immediate deduction of $240 so that it is as though the true credit sales
price were $2,400.97
Thus, under current general accrual principles A's and B's increases
in economic power at the end of the year are both $1,650. Under this
analysis, there appears to be no justification for claiming that the statutory
91. $2,000 selling price less $1,000 basis equals $1,000 gross profit. The gross profit
minus $500 in taxes yields $500 in after-tax profit.
92. The $1,000 return of basis plus $500 after-tax profit is available to be invested. At
20% (the assumed time value of money), the return would be $300 less $150 in taxes, for a
net return of $150.
93. Interest is not reported by an accrual basis taxpayer until it has been earned, unless it
is received in cash at an earlier date. I.R.C. § 451. Thus, even though charged to the
purchaser at the time of sale, it is not earned until one year's passage of time.
94. $500 principal plus $100 interest equals $600.
95. I.R.C. § 163. Interest has always been deductible. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16,
G(b), 38 Stat. 114.
96. Since B is in the 50% bracket, the $100 deduction saves her $50 that would otherwise
have to be paid to the government in cash. If B somehow has no other income against which
to take this deduction, the resulting inequality arises from B's personal financial situation,
not from the use of the accrual method. The tax code has served the interests of equity by
providing the potential for equality through the interest deduction. In addition, B has the
opportunity to carry the deduction over to a year in which she does have other income. See
I.R.C. § 172.
97. In passing on this $240 cost of uncollectibility, B is, in effect, charging the purchaser
for making credit available. The cost is a "true cost," because it is a feature of the
installment credit market, and should be borne by the purchaser. See note 84 supra. On the
other hand, if no bad debt deduction were allowed, and B were forced to report a gain of
$1,240 (based on a sales price of $2,640 with $400 of that to be reported as interest income)
rather than $1,000, then the added cost of paying a tax on the extra $240 of gain would be a
"tax cost" and that is a cost that should not be borne by the purchaser (or the seller for that
matter). See note 85 supra.
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purpose of Section 453(a) is to provide relief for sellers who would
otherwise be forced to bear an unfair share of the tax burden. If this type
of relief was the intended statutory purpose, that intent was based on a
misunderstanding, a fact that now must be recognized.
B. Creation of an Inconvenient Burden
In addition to the principle of equity, Adam Smith identifies
"convenience of payment" as a major principle of taxation. "Every tax
ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most likely
to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. "98 "Convenience of
payment" has become an accepted goal of tax policy. 99
Since taxes must be paid in cash, the most convenient time for a
taxpayer to pay taxes is when he or she has cash from the transaction
giving rise to the tax. For an installment plan retailer the relevant transac-
tion is the installment sale. The cash from the transaction, however, is not
received until later, when the payments are made by the purchaser. As
one commentator noted in discussing the need for Section 453(a), "[a]
retail taxpayer reporting income on the accrual basis finds that he is
paying income tax on the profit from credit sales before the customer
remits the cash."1'°
Requiring a retailer to pay taxes on a gain before the gain has been
converted into cash does create a burden, which is caused by the princi-
ples of the accrual method of tax accounting. But this burden is not
necessarily inequitable. Requiring payment of taxes before the retailer
has received cash from the purchaser simply means that the retailer must
provide the cash from some other source. It may be inconvenient for the
retailer to find another source, but it is not inequitable because, as we
have seen, the burden on him or her is the same as the non-installment
seller's tax burden. 101
Section 453(a) serves to relieve installment plan retailers from the
burden of finding another source for cash to make tax payments. It does
so by deferring payment of taxes until the time at which cash is received
from the purchaser. Thus, Section 453(a) furthers the goal of "conveni-
ence of payment."
"Convenience of payment," however, is not the most important
goal of tax policy. A tax provision cannot be justified on the ground that it
furthers this goal if it seriously conflicts with other goals of tax policy.
Thus, in order to determine whether Section 453(a) is justified, further
analysis is necessary. If the provision conflicts with other goals, then
98. A. SMITH, supra note 61, at 362.
99. J.S. MILL, supra note 62, at 483; Sneed, supra note 85, at 572.
100. Wiese, supra note 55, at 905.
101. Even if the cash must be borrowed, the extra cost of interest paid on the borrowed
funds does not create an inequity, See text accompanying notes 90-96 supra.
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even though it implements "convenience of payment," its justification
will depend on the extent to which it conflicts with other goals. In other
words, the costs of Section 453(a) may outweigh its benefits. If the
question of costs versus benefits is a close one, then the desirability of
Section 453(a) should be viewed in light of feasible alternatives designed
to provide the same benefit, but at less overall cost. The present analysis
must therefore consider two questions: (1) whether Section 453(a)
conflicts with other goals of taxation; and (2) whether there are alterna-
tives which could accomplish the same purpose at lower cost.
1. THE CONFLICT WITH OTHER GOALS
Adam Smith's four principles of taxation have been widely quoted
and discussed by tax theorists.1 2 They serve as a traditional foundation
from which 'more recent writers have built their broader panoplies of
principles. 103 Thus, it seems appropriate to analyze the goal of "conveni-
ence of payment," which is one of Smith's principles, 10 4 by first balanc-
ing it against Smith's other three principles or goals. These principles
may be characterized as (1) equality of taxation; 10 5 (2) certainty; 1°6 and
(3) efficient administration. 0 7 "Convenience of payment" as it is ac-
complished by Section 453(a) need not conflict with the goals of certainty
and efficient administration ipso facto. If the installment method is
clearly delineated, it does little, if any, violence to the goal of certain-
ty.108 Furthermore, it is capable of relatively economical and efficient
administration. 109
The major challenge comes from the goal of equality. 110 With direct
102. See, e.g., J.S. MILL, supra note 62, at 483-95; W. KLEIN, supra note 90, at 103-38.
103. See, e.g., H. GROVES, POSTWAR TAXATION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 373-74 (1946)
[hereinafter cited as H. GROVES]; Sneed, supra note 85, at 567.
104. A. SMITH, supra note 61, at 362.
105. A. SMITH, supra note 61, at 361. See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
106. "The tax which every individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not
arbitrary." A. SMITH, supra note 61, at 362.
107. "Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the
pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public
treasury of the state." Id. Other commentators have added such goals as "redistribution of
wealth," "preservation of incentives," "adequacy," and various other social and economic
goals. H. GROVES, supra note 103, at 373-74; Sneed, supra note 85, at 569-97. These are not
discussed herein because they are tangential to the issues at hand.
108. Unfortunately, the installment method, as it is currently interpreted by the IRS and
the courts, has become so complex that the goal of certainty has been thwarted to some
extent. For a full discussion of many of these hidden complexities, see Cox & Harris,
Installment Sales for "Dealers" in Personal Property: Review and Analysis (pts. 1-4), 4 THE
TAX ADVISER 658, 723 (1973), 5 THE TAX ADVISER 100, 132 (1974).
109. Just as the goal of certainty has been somewhat thwarted by current complexities
underlying § 453(a)'s application,"damage has also been done to the goal of economical and
efficient administration. There is nothing inherent in the operation or application of the
installment method, however, that requires it significantly to undermine either economy or
efficiency.
110. Equality is identical to the goal of equity, which is discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 61-97.
1978:1
HeinOnline  -- 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 19 1978
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
reference to Smith, John Stuart Mill describes this goal as "equality of
sacrifice."'. In other words, each taxpayer should bear his or her fair
share of the burden of the tax. "Fair share," at the very least, means that
similarly situated taxpayers should bear a similar proportion of the tax
burden. In more recent literature, this principle of taxation has come to be
known as the principle of horizontal and vertical equity. 12
In attempting to further the goal of convenience of payment, it is
possible that sufficient harm may be done to the principle of equity that
the desirability of Section 453(a) may become questionable. For exam-
ple, the ultimate convenience would be to allow all taxpayers to wait until
they have received cash before making them pay a tax. Providing for a
strict cash receipts computation of income, however, would create seri-
ous conflicts with equity. Any taxpayer who could arrange to be paid in
property rather than cash would escape taxation altogether. In order to
serve both goals, compromises are necessary. 113 Section 453(a) repre-
sents a typical compromise between equity and convenience of payment.
The question is which goal is best served or, conversely, which goal is
most harmed.
The goal of horizontal equity is harmed, rather than served, by the
operation of Section 453(a). As demonstrated in the prior section, install-
ment plan sellers and other sellers, given comparable powers of business
management, are equally able to pay their taxes. Horizontal equity
requires equal treatment of those who are equally able to pay. Since
Section 453(a) favors installment plan sellers over other sellers, it sub-
verts the goal of horizontal equity. Consider the example of widget sellers
A and B once more. As before, both A and B start out with $1,000 in cash
which they invest in a widget. A sells for cash and B sells for cash in one
year. 114 Everything else is equal and the time value of money is 20%. A
sells for $2,000 cash and B for $2,400 cash due in one year. Both have a
basis in the widget of $1,000. Both pay taxes at the rate of 50%, and taxes
are immediately payable.
At the end of one year, A's total cash will be $1,650.115 B's total
I 1l. J.S. MILL, supra note 62, at 484.
112. Sneed, supra note 85, at 574-81.
113. The cash receipts and disbursements method of reporting income represents a
partial compromise. Admittedly the method is not as accurate a measure of "ability to pay"
as the accrual method and therefore may violate principles of equity to some degree. On the
other hand, the availability of the method serves to further the goal of "convenience of
payment" as well as other practical goals such as "simplicity of record keeping." The
potential degree of harm done to the principle of equity has been reduced by other tax
provisions. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1957), as amended by T.D. 6723, 1946-1 C.B.
73, and T.D. 7154, 1972-1 C.B. 236 (doctrine of constructive receipt); I.R.C. § 1001(b) (fair
market value of property received by a cash basis taxpayer is an "amount realized" for
purposes of computing gain).
114. Under current definitions, B would not qualify as an installment plan seller unless
she received at least two payments. For purposes of simplicity, however, this example
hypothesizes only one payment to be made one year after the sale is completed. Deferral of
payments, not number of payments, is the key element for the purposes of this article.
115. See text accompanying notes 91 and 92 supra.
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cash will be $1,700.i16 Based on these facts, installment treatment (defer-
ral of taxes until cash is received) clearly favors B because it creates a $50
benefit for her which would not otherwise exist.
The foregoing example supports the point made in the foregoing
section-that A and B are equally able to pay and, therefore, the accrual
method of reporting income does not unduly burden installment plan
sellers. The installment method, on the other hand, creates an additional
benefit for B and, therefore, violates the principle of horizontal equity.
Since it conflicts with such an established principle of taxation, alterna-
tive methods of accomplishing the goal of convenience should be con-
sidered.
2. ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR ATAINING CONVENIENCE OF PAYMENT
If Congress had been made aware of the benefit created by the
installment method, as promulgated in the 1918 Treasury regulations, it
might have considered an alternative statutory remedy for the installment
plan seller. One alternative would be to tax all sellers in the same manner,
(that is according to accrual basis principles), and then defer payment of
the tax for installment plan sellers who found themselves short of cash. In
other words, the Government would simply become a lender. Taking our
example involving A and B, if B is forced to borrow $500 to pay the tax
in year one, she would be allowed to borrow from the Government. The
Government would then charge the same 20% interest as our hypothetical
lender charged, assuming that 20% is the true time value of money. 117
Government lending in this manner permits both goals-equity and
convenience-to be served.'18
There are certain problems with this alternative. It may be difficult
to administer. Taxpayer calculations for reporting purposes may become
more complicated. If the time value of money changes, the Government
would have to decide whether or not to change the interest rate.1 19 Such
changes might frustrate attainment of the goal of certainty. Presumably, if
the harm done to other goals of taxation is small, the alternative might be
justified on the principle of equity alone. However, it is not clear how
desirable this option is.
Another alternative would be to repeal Section 453(a) altogether in
116. A $1,400 profit ($2,400 minus $1,000) less $700 in tax paid at the end of the year plus
$1,000 return of basis yields $1,700.
117. Given a 50% tax rate, the 20% interest charge yields an effective rate of 10% given
the offsetting deduction for payment of interest. This is true in the case of both the private
lender and the government lender since interest paid to the government is also deductible.
118. The notion of the Treasury as a lender is not altogether unfamiliar. Under certain
conditions, payment of an estate tax that is otherwise due and payable may be deferred.
Interest is charged on the unpaid portion. I.R.C. §§ 6161, 6166, 6166a.
119. The IRS recently made such an adjustment in the interest rate prescribed pursuant
to § 483, which deals with imputed interest. See Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(c)(2)(1966), as
amended by T.D. 7154, 1972-1 C.B. 236, and T.D. 7394, 1976-1 C.B. 135.
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the interest of equity. One should inquire, however, as to what effect that
would have on the principle of convenience. In 1918, when installment
plan selling was relatively new, merchants found themselves unable to
borrow from outside sources merely on the strength of expected future
collections from installment sales accounts. 120 This phenomenon, how-
ever, no longer exists. Since World War II, accounts receivable financing
in general has increased,1 21 and the assignment of consumer installment
sales contracts to financial institutions in exchange for immediate cash
has become a standard practice. 122 If the retail merchant can readily
obtain cash with which to pay the tax, then the fact that he or she does not
finally collect cash from a purchaser until some later time has no bearing
on the issue of taxpayer convenience. 123 Moreover, the fact that he or she
might suffer an added interest expense in order to obtain cash for tax
payments does not, as has been demonstrated, conflict with principles of
equity. 124
Because Section 453(a) violates the principle of horizontal equity by
creating a benefit for installment plan sellers, one can justify its continued
existence on the ground that it furthers the goal of convenience of
payment only if the benefits conferred upon the goal of convenience
outweigh the harm done to the goal of equity. In 1918, when sellers were
unable to borrow from financial institutions, perhaps the benefits out-
weighed the harm. 25 Today, however, financial institutions are willing
to provide temporary cash to installment sellers. Thus, the benefits have
lessened and Section 453(a)'s continued justification on the basis of
'convenience of payment" has become questionable.
IV. OTHER GROUNDS FOR JUSTIFICATION OF SECTION 453(a)
Traditionally, Section 453(a) has been identified as a relief measure.
However, as the foregoing section of this article demonstrates, the relief
provided is neither necessary nor appropriate. Rather than distributing the
tax burden more equitably, Section 453(a) actually creates an inequity by
giving preferential treatment to those taxpayers who both qualify for and
elect to use the installment method.
Equity, however, is not the only goal of taxation. There are many
provisions in the current tax structures which create inequities. The
120. Doyle, supra note 6, at 53.
121. C. PHELPS, ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE FINANCING AS A METHOD OF SECURING BUSINESS
LOANS 11 (2d ed. 1962).
122. See P. MCCRACKEN, J. MAO, & C. FRICKE, CONSUMER INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND
PUBLIC POLICY 710 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CONSUMER INSTALLMENT CREDIT].
123. For a broader discussion of changes in the consumer credit industry, see text
accompanying notes 140-143 infra.
124. See text accompanying notes 90-97 supra.
125. Other less harmful alternatives may nonetheless have been available, such as
borrowing from the Treasury, as was discussed in the text accompanying notes 117-19
supra.
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deduction for interest payments by homeowners, for example, creates an
inequity which renters are quick to decry. Such provisions must seek
justification in some other goal of tax policy.126
At present there are three main tax goals or objectives which Presi-
dent Carter and his administration have enumerated. These are equity,
simplification, and economic growth. 127 Representative Al Ullman, the
current Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, also empha-
sizes these goals. 128 Although simplification and economic growth were
only recently identified as separate goals of tax policy, they have been
implicitly recognized as important considerations for some time. 129
The goal of simplification is clearly not a ground upon which
Section 453(a) can be justified. Section 453(a) creates a method of
accounting for income in addition to the accrual method, and is fraught
with complexities that the accrual method lacks.1 30
The goal of economic growth, however, presents a more favorable
possibility as a ground for justification. Economic growth, it could be
argued, was aided in the early part of this century by the retailer who was
willing to extend credit to installment plan purchasers.
The record of expansion and development of the consumer
installment lending industry, impressive as it may be when
taken by itself, has its greatest significance in the wider context
of its contribution to the growth and expansion of the economy
generally. . . . The complex methods of mass production from
which we have derived the important gains in productivity that
have provided the foundation for advances in real incomes,
were made possible only by the emergence of mass markets.
Mass markets for such items as automobiles, whose large pur-
chase price really constitutes an act of consumer investment,
required that means of financing be readily available to
consumers. . . . The industry of lending to consumers on the
installment plan emerged to fill that need and thereby played a
vital role in the country's economic development. 1 '
126. For example, the interest deduction on home mortgages is justified on the grounds
that it provides an indirect governmental subsidy to the building industry which is intended
to aid the economic growth of the country as a whole. See [1968] TREAS. SEC'Y ANN. REP.
ON FINANCES 327, 329-330.
127. Comments of Laurence N. Woodworth, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Policy, at a recent Conference on Tax Policy and Economic Growth, co-sponsored by
Representative Barber Conable and the National Journal, held in Washington, D.C. (Nov.
14-15, 1977).
128. Speech by Rep. Ullman at Conference on Tax Policy and Economic Growth, in
Washington, D.C. (Nov. 14, 1977).
129. Simplicity, for example, is implicit in Adam Smith's goals of certainty and efficient
administration.
130. For example, the sampling procedures in Reg. § 1.453-2(d) (1965), which must be
followed to determine which revolving credit sales qualify for installment treatment, are an
additional complexity of the installment method.
131. CONSUMER INSTALLMENT CREDIT, supra note 122, at 2-3.
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Because the extension of installment plan credit was beneficial to overall
economic growth, it arguably was appropriate to provide an indirect
governmental subsidy in the form of a tax benefit to the persons supplying
that credit. Section 453(a), in providing a benefit to installment plan
retailers, accomplished this objective.
Although it may be possible, in retrospect, to characterize Section
453(a) as a tax subsidy aimed at improving economic growth, it is
unrealistic to suppose that it was ever intended as such. There is nothing
in the legislative history or the writings of early commentators and
supporters of the provision to suggest that the installment method was
perceived as a tax benefit linked to economic growth and production.
Nevertheless, whether conscious or not, the immediate reaction of
Congress in 1926 to the Board of Tax Appeals invalidation of the
Treasury regulation permitting the installment method 132 may indicate a
recognition of the important role installment plan retailers were playing in
this country's economic development. Perhaps, then, it would be fair to
characterize Section 453(a) as a subconscious enactment of an indirect
subsidy aimed at economic growth. We must determine, however, if it
can withstand scrutiny as a tax subsidy. In other words, the question is
whether Section 453(a) may be justified today on the ground that it
effectively furthers the goal of economic growth.
This question is difficult at the outset because it poses the underlying
question of what type of activity will improve the country's economic
growth, more spending or more saving. Although most economists are
advocating more savings in order to cope with a perceived imminent
capital shortage, some Keynesians still advocate spending. 133 This article
will not deal with the underlying question. Instead, it will analyze Section
453(a) under each of the two alternative means suggested for improving
economic growth.
A. Economic Growth and Consumer Spending
According to Keynesian economic theory, increased consumption
leads to an increase in production.' 34 The availability of installment plan
credit effectively opened up new markets for producers. 135 The wage
earner, who typically had very little money left out of each paycheck once
the rent was paid and groceries purchased, could hardly afford to invest in
such consumer durables as phonographs, washing machines and auto-
mobiles. With the advent of the installment plan, the wage earner was
able to purchase such items, take immediate possession, and pay the price
132. See text accompanying notes 21-28 supra.
133. See TAX POLICY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, A NATIONAL JOURNAL ISSUES BOOK
(1977); Comments by participants at Nov. 14-15, 1977 conference, note 127 supra.
134. See J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 372-
376 (1936).
135. See text accompanying note 131 supra.
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out of future earnings, with a small portion coming out of each paycheck.
This increase in consumption led to an increase in production. Increased
production fostered greater economic growth, which in turn led to in-
creased wages and employment. This resulted in more money for
consumers to make additional purchases while still paying off prior
installment sales obligations.
If this cycle were to continue without interruption, then each stage
would lead to an expansion at the following stage, with the result that
overall growth would continue.136 The availability of consumer credit is
an integral part of this hypothesized cycle, and presumably any increase
in the availability of consumer credit will result in greater economic
growth. 137 Thus, an argument could be made that any indirect subsidy to
those who provide this necessary credit will help accomplish the final
goal of increased economic growth, and therefore be justified as a tax
provision.
This argument, however, must be scrutinized more closely by asking
whether it is rational to provide this subsidy in the manner prescribed by
Section 453(a). Whether Section 453(a) is an appropriate means depends
on a number of factors. For example, it makes little sense to rely on the
complexities of Section 453(a) if there is some other less complex way to
provide the subsidy, provided this alternative is directed, as Section
453(a), at the activity intended to be benefited. Because the installment
method is available only for gains derived from installment credit sales,
Section 453(a) appears to be sufficiently narrow in the benefits it confers.
There are, however, alternatives to Section 453(a) which can be equally
as narrow and yet less complex. For example, retailers could be given a
special deduction or credit linked to their installment plan sales.' 38 In-
stallment plan sales would still have to be identified, but all sales income
would be reported on the accrual basis. This would avoid numerous
problems caused by the installment method of accounting itself. 139
136. This hypothetical cycle ignores for the moment other factors that might affect
economic growth, such as investment in permanent capital.
137. Of course when the economic system of the United States is viewed as a closed
system, it is somewhat unrealistic to consider an increase in consumer credit in the abstract,
without, for example, considering its effect on the overall money supply. However, for
purposes of the argument in the text, abstract considerations are sufficient.
138. If the indirect benefit in promoting economic growth produced by Section 453(a)
were equivalent in value to 5% of all installment credit sales, then a direct credit against
taxes equal to 5% of installment credit sales made within the taxable year would accomplish
the same result. More specifically, Section 453(a) may stimulate economic growth by giving
the installment seller a cash subsidy, compared to his or her financial position under the
accrual method. See text accompanying notes 114-116 supra. A tax credit to the same extent
gives the installment seller an equivalent cash subsidy, thereby stimulating growth to the
same extent.
139. Problems as to whether or not a disposition of the installment obligation had
occurred, thereby accelerating gain, would be avoided. There no longer would be the
question of which expenses should be deducted currently and which allocated to cost of
goods sold. The installment method also poses problems relating to corporate mergers and
subchapter S corporations which would be avoided. See generally Cox & Harris, Installment
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Another question is whether it makes sense to provide a governmen-
tal subsidy to just one type of taxpayer providing consumer installment
credit. Although retailers may have been the main source of this type of
credit in 1918, that is certainly not the case any more. Today consumer
installment credit, and consumer credit in general, are big business. At
the end of 1974, financial institutions held 63% of all outstanding "other
consumer goods" paper. 14o Commercial banks currently provide most of
the financing for consumer purchases of automobiles."'4 Credit for small-
er consumer purchases is extended directly to the purchasers via bank
credit cards.' 42 In 1975, retailers, who used to be the major source of
consumer credit, held only 11% of all outstanding consumer credit. ' 43
Consumer credit has become a competitive moneymaking business
itself, separate from the actual sale of goods. Since financial institutions
have the resources to engage in this activity on a larger scale and at lower
costs than the small retailer, they have largely taken over the consumer
credit business. No tax subsidy was necessary to encourage financial
institutions to enter the field of consumer credit. 1"
The subsidy provided by Section 453(a) is justified, if at all, because
it is directed at a particular activity, extension of consumer installment
credit. The economic growth argument, however, does not require that
the credit be extended by retailers, because it may be adequately supplied
by financial institutions, which, as was shown earlier, is the case today. It
also does not require that the credit extended be installment credit. 141 It is
therefore difficult to justify Section 453(a) as a desirable subsidy to
consumer credit.'1 6 It may, in fact, produce undesirable results. For
example, the takeover of the consumer credit industry by financial institu-
tions occurred because financial institutions were able to provide such
credit at less cost than the retailer. The continued subsidization of retail-
ers via Section 453(a) is a subsidization of the less efficient lender which
can only be justified if it serves to accomplish some other unrelated
purpose. No such purpose seems plausible. Therefore, Section 453(a)
remains unjustified.
Sales for "Dealers" in Personal Property: Review and Analysis (pt. iv), 5 TAx ADVISER 132,
139-140 (1974).
140. 62 FED. RES. BULL. A46 (1976). The term "other consumer goods" refers to
consumer goods other than automobiles.
141. Id.
142. See The Impact of Credit Cards on Small Business: Hearings Before the Subcommit-
tee on Special Small Business Problems of the House of Representatives Select Committee on
Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 351-444 (1970).
143. 62 FED. RES. BULL. A46 (1976).
144. Although banks have benefited from a number of tax breaks such as that provided
by I.R.C. § 585 (which provides for bad debt reserves in excess of actual losses), none of
them have been directly related to consumer credit.
145. This argument applies except to the extent that installment credit, if characterized
by small periodic payments over a sufficiently long period of time, serves to provide credit
on terms consumers find attractive and easy to manage.
146. If consumer credit is worthy of a subsidy, the Government would have more effect
if it subsidized banks that extend consumer credit.
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B. Economic Growth and Savings
There is little disagreement among the existing studies that
investment as a percentage of GNP will have to increase some-
what over the next decade if previous rates of productivity
growth are to be maintained with employment and if the nation
is to meet the special capital requirements in areas of energy
and pollution abatement. 47
If we once again characterize Section 453(a) as a tax subsidy direct-
ed at consumer credit and spending, we would have to conclude im-
mediately that Section 453(a) poses a threat to savings and investment,
and thus a threat to economic growth. In fact, it is difficult to reach any
other conclusion.
As noted earlier, one currently popular school of economic thought
teaches that taxpayers should be encouraged to invest rather than spend.
Because a tax break to retailers for installment sales is likely to stimulate
consumption rather than savings, Section 453(a), in creating such a
benefit, frustrates the policy embodied in other tax provisions that en-
courage investment.148 It can hardly be justified as furthering economic
growth if attainment of that goal is seen as requiring more savings and
investment.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has demonstrated that although Section 453(a) was
probably intended as a relief measure, there is no justification for provid-
ing that relief today. Furthermore, since Section 453(a) violates the goals
of equity and simplification, and because it cannot be justified as a
sensible means for fostering economic growth, it should be repealed.
In the interest of fairness and of certainty, however, the repeal
should be accomplished as follows: first, the effective date of repeal
should be at least 3 years after the repeal is enacted; second, retailers
should be allowed to elect to report a portion of their installment sales
income which would otherwise be deferred, in any year during the 3-year
period. This option would provide a transition period which could be
phased in as the retailer-taxpayers choose. It should make no difference to
the Commissioner how much an individual elects to report in a given year
because election would only accelerate recognition of income to earlier
than the end of the 3-year period. At the end of the 3 years, all retailers
would be reporting on the accrual method, and all unreported installment
sales income would have to be accrued.
147. Bosworth, Capital Formation in Times of Economic Crisis, in TAX POLICY AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH, A NATIONAL JOURNAL ISSUES BOOK 14 (1977).
148. For example, there is the investment tax credit provided in I.R.C. §§ 38, 46-50.
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